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Measures to eliminate international terrorism

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Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 3 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the latest incidents in the ongoing Palestinian campaign of terrorism directed against Israel.

At approximately 7.15 p.m. (local time) last night, two Palestinian terrorists, armed with hand grenades and automatic weapons, infiltrated the Israeli community of Alei Sinai, killing an Israeli couple — Liron Harpaz, age 19, and Assaf Itzhaki, age 21 — and wounding 15 others. The gunmen then barricaded themselves inside a house where they engaged in a heavy gun battle with Israeli forces for several hours before being subdued. The terrorist organization Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

Earlier yesterday, a car bomb exploded in the southern Jerusalem neighbourhood of Talpiot shortly after 9.00 a.m. (local time), wounding several pedestrians. The vehicle was in a small parking lot next to an apartment building and, in addition to a 12-kilogram bomb, was packed with a liquid propane gas tank, automatic rifle bullets, ball bearings, nails and other metal parts in order to magnify the lethal effect of the blast. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the blast.

In yet another incident, Palestinian snipers opened fire today on several Jewish worshippers outside the Cave of Patriarchs, one of the most sacred sites to both Jews and Muslims, wounding four women. Those wounded, who had travelled to the site in celebration of the Jewish festival of Tabernacles, were evacuated to nearby hospitals.

These attacks are the latest incidents in the Palestinians' continuing terrorist war that has persisted without respite for more than a year. Previous attacks have been detailed in my letters dated 24 September 2001 (A/56/406-S/2001/907), 20 September 2001 (A/56/386-S/2001/892), 17 September 2001 (A/56/367-S/2001/875), 7 September 2001 (A/56/346-S/2001/858), 4 September 2001 (A/56/331-S/2001/840), 30 August 2001 (A/56/325-S/2001/834), 27 August 2001 (A/56/324-S/2001/825), 13 August 2001 (A/56/294-S/2001/787), 9 August 2001 (A/56/286-S/2001/780), 8 August 2001 (A/56/280-S/2001/775), 6 August 2001 (A/56/272-S/2001/768), 27 July 2001 (A/56/225-S/2001/743), 26 July 2001

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(A/56/223-S/2001/737), 17 July 2001 (A/56/201-S/2001/706), 13 July 2001 (A/56/184-S/2001/696), 3 July 2001 (A/56/138-S/2001/662), 2 July 2001 (A/56/131-S/2001/656), 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108) and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

The State of Israel holds the Palestinian leadership responsible for these attacks in light of its relentless incitement of the population to violence, its open collusion with declared terrorist groups, and its adamant refusal to take concrete measures against known terrorists. Since the outbreak of violence over a year ago, the Palestinian Authority has released convicted terrorists from prison, openly aided and abetted them in carrying out their murderous aggression, and granted them safe harbour in the territory under its control, all the while continuing to make fictitious claims of adhering to a ceasefire.

The latest of these empty declarations came last week following a meeting between Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres. Following Chairman Arafat's call for a ceasefire, Israel implemented several measures to ease conditions for the Palestinian people, pursuant to the understandings reached. Nevertheless, the attacks continued unabated.

Israel takes note of Chairman Arafat's condemnation of the attack at Alei Sinai, but reiterates that words are insufficient and must be bolstered by a concerted and discernible effort to calm the situation on the ground. As is apparent from events over the last several days, the Palestinian leadership's condemnations and calls for a ceasefire are hollow pronouncements, divorced from the reality on the street, designed to obscure continuing Palestinian support for terrorist operations.

Israel again calls on the Palestinian leadership to fulfil its repeated legal obligations to renounce the use of violence and terrorism and to control and punish those who continue to engage in such practices. Israel further calls on the international community to take steps to eradicate this terrorism and its supporters within the context of the global campaign against terrorism, and compel the Palestinian Authority to fulfil its obligations to prevent its territory from being used as a base for terror operations and return to the path of peaceful negotiations.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda **Lancry**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/939

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Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of paragraph 13 (a) of resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia

I. Introduction

1. In operative paragraph 13 (a) of its resolution 1343 (2001) of 7 March 2001, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide, six months from the date of the adoption of the resolution, a preliminary assessment of the potential economic, humanitarian and social impact on the Liberian population of possible follow-up action by the Security Council in the areas of investigation indicated in paragraph 19 (c) of the resolution.

2. In operative paragraphs 5 to 7 of the same resolution, the Security Council imposed limited sanctions on Liberia, including (a) the prohibition of the sale or supply of arms and related material to Liberia; (b) a ban on the import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not such diamonds originated in Liberia; and (c) the prohibition of travel abroad by senior members of the Government of Liberia and its armed forces and their spouses and any other individuals, as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 14 of the resolution.

II. Procedure and methodology

3. This preliminary assessment is based on extensive discussions, field observations made during a mission to Liberia and secondary data collection with representatives of the Government of Liberia, Liberian citizens, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

4. The purpose of the present report is to provide the Council with additional information on the potential impact of actions that the Council may consider imposing on Liberia.

5. Referring to Security Council discussions prior to the adoption of its resolution 1343 (2001) and following discussions with the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 19 of the resolution and others, the assessment focuses on the following areas that the Council may consider for possible future sanctions:

(a) The timber extraction industry;

(b) Rubber production and export;

(c) The Liberian ship register.

6. The methodology for the present assessment comprises two broad approaches. The first uses available information from a wide variety of sources to identify and track changes in the economic, social and humanitarian situation to characterize the conditions of life in Liberia today. This provides background information on pre-existing trends and a baseline against which potential impacts of possible future measures can be assessed.

7. Information was drawn predominantly from original sources to facilitate the assessment of their veracity, the definitions of terms used and the accuracy and comprehensiveness of available information. If these were accounting documents from the Government of Liberia, those responsible for generating the documents were interviewed. If information was drawn from surveys, those leading the surveys were interviewed about their methodologies. If estimates or projections were used, the assumptions underlying those estimates were examined with the authors.

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8. The second approach draws together sector-specific information relating to the Liberian timber, rubber and maritime industries. Information was gathered from interviews with sector leaders, Government representatives and United Nations staff working with those industries, and from field observations at industry sites. An analysis was then made of each of these sectors regarding direct and indirect employment, the population supported by the industry and government revenues generated.

III. Present situation in Liberia

Economic and social conditions

9. In 1980, Liberia was one of the region's more economically advanced countries. Its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was about US$ 485 and life expectancy at birth exceeded 54 years. These were then among the highest indicators in sub-Saharan Africa. Economic activity in Liberia's formal sector in the pre-civil war years was heavily concentrated on the production and export of iron ore, natural rubber, timber and crops, including coffee, cocoa and palm products. A large traditional sector was engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture, artisanal mining and small-scale commercial activities.

10. The civil war (1989-1996) took a heavy toll on the economy, with disastrous consequences on the social fabric of the country. Iron ore mining and rubber production were halted in the early stages of the conflict. Food production and other agricultural output plummeted as people abandoned villages in some of the most fertile areas of the country. There was widespread destruction of most of the country's physical infrastructure and buildings, including schools, hospitals, factories and houses. Destruction and looting of economic assets, such as machinery and equipment, were also widespread. Public utilities, such as electricity, water and sewage facilities, were destroyed and were not repaired or rebuilt.

11. Following the civil war, modest economic activity and small-scale domestic investment resumed, mainly because of a recovery in agricultural production. However, iron ore production never resumed because of lack of investment funds to restore war-damaged equipment and facilities. Production of rubber was reinvigorated in 1997, but the current output is about half of pre-civil war levels. The timber industry is the only sector that has attracted significant new foreign investment funds.

12. Today, Liberia is classified by the United Nations as one of the least developed countries in the world due to its low average per capita GDP (US$ 177 in 2000, less than half the value in the 1980s), lack of economic diversification and poor prospects for sustained economic development.

Employment

13. As much as 30 per cent of the Liberian labour force was employed in the formal sector prior to 1986. Half of them lost their employment during the 1990s. Today, the formal sector employs an estimated 120,000 Liberians (20 per cent of the economically active population in Liberia), of whom 57,000 are public employees. The number of public employees has doubled in the last 10 years despite a decline in the gross national product (GNP). Nominal salaries for government employees average 1,500 Liberian dollars (L$) a month (about 27 United States dollars (US$)), but effective salaries are even lower due to payment arrears of seven months, discounts, and levies of formal and informal taxes.

14. Iron ore mining used to be the country's predominant economic activity, contributing up to 25 per cent of GDP and employing 20 to 25,000 people. It ended with the outbreak of the war in 1986 and has not resumed. In the past, alluvial diamond mining employed up to 60,000 Liberians. Today, only small-scale hand mining of diamond and gold is done. It reportedly occupies up to 6,000 Liberian miners and constitutes no more than 3 per cent of GDP. Prices paid to miners for rough diamonds by brokers in Monrovia are reported to be down by half since the imposition of the United Nations diamond ban in May 2001, thus reducing incentives to engage or invest in diamond mining.

15. In recent years, in the absence of mining, rubber production has constituted the largest sector of the Liberian economy. But rubber sales are still currently only a little more than half of the US$ 170 million they generated in the early 1980s; in 2000, they represented 14 per cent of GDP. The six major rubber producers employ about 20,000 Liberians and provide rubber tree seedlings, tools, purchasing brokerage and extension services to an additional 5,000 to 10,000 smallholders.

On average, a rubber worker earns about US$ 2.5 a day.

16. With the collapse of iron ore mining and following substantial foreign investment in timber, since the civil war timber has become the second largest sector of the Liberian economy. Twenty-six timber companies now employ an estimated 10,000 people and Liberia's timber exports earned about US$ 50 million during 2000 and are expected to value US$ 70 million in 2001. The largest, most modern and newest operator, the Oriental Timber Company (OTC), has invested US$ 100 million in its activities in Liberia since 1999 and shipped a little more than half of all timber exported in the year 2000. OTC currently employs 2,500 Liberians.

17. In the first venture to process timber rather than simply export it raw, OTC intends to employ another 1,500 Liberians in a plywood factory currently under construction in the port of Buchanan. The plant manager anticipates beginning production before the end of 2001. There are currently no more than a total of 500 employees in the largest 11 manufacturing firms of all types in the country. Thus, the OTC plywood factory represents by far the largest current investment in manufacture in the country.

Humanitarian conditions

18. Mortality rates and life expectancy are believed to have hardly changed in the last 20 years in Liberia. Estimates of infant mortality per 1,000 live births vary from 114 to 157. The percentage of children under age two vaccinated against polio and diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus (DPT) fell from 80 per cent in 1987 to about 20 per cent in 1997. About one third of the population had access to modern health services before 1987. This figure fell to 10 per cent during the war and has only recovered in part. Only 7 of Liberia's 30 hospitals and 15 of its 130 health centres were still functioning in 1997. About half subsequently reopened, at least partially, but many of these have since closed again due to lack of supplies, staff and funding. Liberia had 550 doctors in 1980 and has about 100 today, of whom only 25 work full time in the public health-care system. The main public hospital in Monrovia, the John F. Kennedy Hospital, closed in 2000. The Liberian capital, with a population of 700,000, is now served mainly by Redemption Hospital, where four doctors and 208 other staff care for about 600 inpatients and 10,000 outpatients each month. Most of the supplies, salaries, and two of the hospital's four doctors are provided by Médecin sans frontières Belgium.

19. Today, only 37 per cent of adults in Liberia have completed primary school and are thus considered literate. About 80 per cent of the population lives in poverty (on less than US$ 1 a day), and about half of those in poverty live in absolute poverty (on less than US$ 0.50 a day). Most people are engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture. Nonetheless, they also depend on the cash economy for tools, seed, fertilizer, transport and medicines. These are purchased with the little supplemental income generated from the sale of food crops, charcoal, palm oil or paid labour. Two thirds of the average Liberian household budget is used to purchase food. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Liberia is among the 18 countries of the world with the least overall food security.

20. A Demographic Household Survey (DHS) carried out in 1999 showed that 19 per cent of Liberian households are headed by females. Thirty per cent of children live with only one parent and 20 per cent live with neither parent. The survey demonstrates further that more than half of all Liberians were displaced within the country at least once during the 1990s. Some 220,000 Liberians live as refugees in neighbouring countries and about 40,000 more have been internally displaced since spring 2000 due to the fighting in Lofa County, in the north-west of Liberia.

21. The human development index (HDI) is the most widely used summary measure of people's overall living conditions.[1] In 1992, Liberia had an HDI score of 0.325, ranking the country at 159 out of 173 countries. This rate was similar to the average for all sub-Saharan countries in 1970 and the 29 least developed countries of the world in 1975. By 1999, the HDI of Liberia had declined to 0.276, ranking the country at 174 out of 175 countries. Underdevelopment, war and the inability to re-establish political and economic stability in the post-war period have left Liberia and Sierra Leone at the bottom of the HDI ranking (see table).

22. Liberians exhibit several coping mechanisms in facing these difficult conditions. First, as most people are identified with one of the 15 tribes in the country, bonds of family support extend throughout the country and across national borders. On average, a Liberian breadwinner supports nine others, but it is not unusual to encounter an employee supporting as many as 20

Comparative social indicators, 1999

	Liberia	*Sierra Leone*	*Guinea*	*Ivory Coast*	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	*Least developed countries*
Life expectancy at birth	42.3	37.9	46.9	46.9	48.9	51.9
Infant deaths per 1,000 live births	134	182	115	102	105	104
Percentage of literate adults	37	31	36	45	42	51
GDP (in million US$)	480	458	1 782	1 598	1 607	1 064
Human development index	0.276	0.252	0.394	0.420	0.464	0.435
(Rank among the 175 countries assessed)	(174)	(175)	(162)	(154)	(135)	(141)[a]

Sources: UNDP, *Human Development Report, 2000*, and UNICEF, *Situation Analysis, 2001*.

[a] Average rank for the region is closest to the country ranked 141 of 175 countries.

dependants. Second, most Liberians depend predominantly on non-market subsistence agriculture. According to the above-mentioned DHS, 72 per cent of the population is engaged in growing food and raising animals. Third, Liberians living overseas have a long tradition of providing funds for family in Liberia through remittances. According to the Liberian Central Bank, remittances recorded by the banking system totalled US$ 23.4 million in 2000.

23. Despite these coping mechanisms, the resilience of the Liberian population and their capacity to adapt to further economic shocks is now very limited. Thus, the humanitarian consequences of any additional aggravating factors are likely to be more rapid and far-reaching than in a situation where communities' coping mechanisms are less depleted. The most vulnerable include those who are displaced, female headed families, those without a relative with regular employment, children not living with at least one parent and those living in areas of ongoing fighting. These groups constitute a large proportion of Liberia's population.

IV. The measures imposed by the Security Council in its resolution 1343 (2001) on Liberia

24. The sanctions imposed by the Security Council in its resolution 1343 (2001) are limited in scope and targeted at specific individuals and activities. The following paragraphs describe the context of the current sanctions regime and the response of the Government of Liberia regarding these measures.

Currency depreciation and domestic inflation

25. The exchange rate of the Liberian dollar is free to float and no black market for foreign currency exists. Between 1997 and 2000, the exchange rate remained within a range of 37 to 42 Liberian dollars to 1 United States dollar and was considered the most stable currency among countries in the region. Each year in December and July, the Liberian dollar strengthened relative to the United States dollar because of the increase in holiday-related remittances.

26. However, between December 2000 and August 2001, the Liberian dollar weakened continuously in the face of fear and speculation in the market regarding the possible imposition of United Nations sanctions on the country. In the first 10 days of January 2001, the Liberian dollar lost value at unprecedented speed, depreciating from L$ 42 to US$ 1 to L$ 52 to US$ 1. Through August 2001, the rate fell further to L$ 60 to US$ 1. But following an injection of United States dollars by the Liberian Central Bank, the payment of salary arrears to public employees and a growing belief that further United Nations sanctions are unlikely, the Liberian dollar strengthened in September 2001 to reach L$ 50 to US$ 1 (see figure I).

Figure I
Value of Liberian dollars relative to a current United States dollar, January 2000-September 2001



Source: Central Bank of Liberia.

27. The discussions about sanctions on Liberia and their subsequent imposition have affected public confidence in the Liberian economy. Hoarding, capital flight and reduced inflow of foreign currencies into the Liberian banking system were consequences and have contributed to the weakness of the Liberian dollar in 2001. The depreciation of the Liberian dollar has driven up prices of imported goods, including rice, medicines, petroleum products and other essential commodities.

International assistance

28. Liberia was long a favoured recipient of international assistance. The predominant portion of this was food aid during the 1980s. International assistance during most years from 1980 to 1997 exceeded US$ 100 million per year. However, since 1998 there has been a steady decline in donor support for Liberia. International assistance has decreased by US$ 50 to 100 million per year to less than US$ 30 million in 2001 (see figure II).

29. The result of this decline has been a rapid fall in the capacity of aid agencies to provide the needed assistance. For example:

(a) Action Aid, whose funding for rural agriculture development was delayed so long that the programme was not able to start during the planting season of 2001;

(b) Save the Children UK, which is now scaling back its support from 19 to 10 health clinics;

(c) Médecin sans frontières Belgium, which has lost much of its bilateral funding and anticipates reducing support and staffing to the Redemption Hospital in Monrovia within months.

30. For some of these and other organizations, the funding shortfalls are so great that they are considering the termination of their assistance programmes in Liberia. Given the absence of alternative social safety nets for a lot of Liberians, this would mean the loss of remaining support, which would greatly affect their welfare. Hospitals and health centres would have to further limit their services and several medical

Figure II
International assistance for Liberia



Sources: UNICEF donors report and United Nations common country assessment.

facilities would even have to close completely. Schools would have to increase tuition fees, thereby reducing further the portion of the school-aged population in attendance. Assistance to displaced persons would decline, resulting in more hardship and higher mortality rates among them. Support for improvements in subsistence agriculture would decline, resulting in lower productivity, increased hunger and food insecurity.

Response of the Government of Liberia to the current sanctions regime

31. The Government of Liberia has mounted a public information campaign, blaming the United Nations sanctions regime for the decline in international assistance, the lack of economic growth, the continued fighting in Lofa County, the inflation of the Liberian dollar and the rise in prices for basic commodities. This initiative encourages the perception that United Nations sanctions do — and are intended to — harm the civilian population. Even critics of the Liberian Government believe that the governmental campaign is effective. The Government disseminates its positions via radio, newspapers and billboards throughout the country.

32. This anti-sanctions campaign of the Government of Liberia also affects the operating environment of the United Nations and other international agencies, and raises concerns about the security conditions for humanitarian workers and United Nations personnel.

V. Potential impact of possible future United Nations sanctions on Liberia

33. As mentioned in paragraph 5 above, the present report assesses the potential impact of possible future sanctions on the following areas:

(a) The timber extraction industry;

(b) Rubber production and export;

(c) The Liberian ship register.

A. The impact of possible future sanctions on the Liberian timber industry[2]

34. A ban on Liberian timber exports would probably cause the loss of up to 10,000 relatively well-paid jobs. With an average of nine dependants for each employed person and a probably higher than average number of dependants per employed person in this more affluent economic sector, a figure of 90,000 to 95,000 people losing their primary means of support could be expected.

35. The shortfall of an estimated US$ 10 million annually in salaries to timber workers would surely have carry-over effects to others in the formal and informal sectors, including suppliers of clothing, food and building materials in the communities of timber workers. Given the very vulnerable economic situation in Liberia, only a few of those who would lose employment in the timber industry would be likely to find alternative employment. Many would probably seek to join family or neighbours in subsistence agriculture, while some would try to emigrate to neighbouring countries in search of work.

36. According to the *2000 Economic Review* of the United Nations Development Programme, the Liberian timber industry overall provided US$ 7.7 million in fees, taxes and royalties to the Government of Liberia during 2000, representing about 9 per cent of the total national budget. If this revenue is lost, all sectors of the Liberian budget would probably come under further pressure. In addition, income taxes might be increased, salary payment arrears would grow, the prices of imported goods would rise and new taxes on petty traders and foreigners would likely be introduced.

37. The Liberian Government announced in August 2001 that US$ 7.5 million of governmental timber revenues would be designated for rural development in local counties. Accordingly, the Governor of Maryland County announced that part of these funds would be used for the renovation of the local college. While there is no certainty that this project would actually have been implemented, any international restrictions on Liberian timber would probably be blamed on its failing to come to fruition.

38. Secondary industries directly related to timber in Liberia are shipping and the plywood factory currently under construction in the port of Buchanan. Timber exports constitute the predominant commercial activity at three of the country's four ports. A halt in timber shipping would eliminate most of these jobs and cause the ports to greatly reduce their operations. This would also reduce funds for port maintenance and reduce secondary economic activities in port communities.

39. Timber companies provide health and education services to their employees, their families and the local communities in which they operate. A ban on timber exports would reduce or eliminate these services. OTC, for example, renovated and reopened the Buchanan port hospital and provides US$ 30,000 a month for its operation. Given that the public hospital in Buchanan has mainly been closed since the war, the OTC hospital is the major regional medical institution. Unless an alternative source for the operating costs of this hospital is found, this facility would probably close with the stoppage of OTC logging activities.

40. Timber firms also construct and maintain most of the roads in remote areas of Liberia. Accordingly, a ban on logging activities would affect the maintenance and probable further construction of such roads and thus affect road access for communities in isolated rural areas.

41. A ban on select Liberian timber companies, which is also considered as a possible follow-up action by the Council, would probably have less severe impacts than those specified above. However, unlike a total ban on the timber sector it would probably stimulate an intermediate business of reregistering and re-labelling of logs from banned companies to non-banned companies. Doing so would nonetheless taint the entire industry, reducing access to markets for timber from Liberia and depressing prices paid to other Liberian timber producers, thereby also depressing the production of non-sanctioned timber companies.

B. The impact of possible future sanctions on the Liberian rubber industry

42. International sanctions on Liberian rubber would directly affect more Liberians than sanctions on timber. Many of the 20,000 people employed by the main rubber producers in Liberia (Firestone in Margibi, Liberia Agriculture Company in Sinoe, Guthrie in

Bomi) would lose employment, as well as the 5,000 to 10,000 independent owners of small-scale rubber holdings, who also depend on these firms. Since many of these people live in permanent settlements on rubber plantations, alternative sources of employment or subsistence would probably be more difficult for rubber workers than for timber workers. If 25,000 rubber workers support an average of nine dependants each, a total of 225,000 persons would be directly affected by restrictions on Liberian rubber.

43. The total value of salaries and government revenues generated by the timber and rubber industries is similar. If sanctions were imposed on rubber, the potential effects and wider implications of reduced revenues to the government from this sector would thus be similar to those detailed above in paragraph 36 above.

C. The impact of possible future sanctions on the Liberian ship register

44. The Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs is a register for commercial ships. With 1,600 ships flying the Liberian flag, this is the second most subscribed ship registry in the world. The Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs generated US$ 18 million in the year 2000 for the Government of Liberia, representing 20 per cent of the national budget.

45. The Bureau of Maritime Affairs employs less than 100 Liberian staff and most of the registry's work is carried out in offices abroad. Therefore, little direct impact on the Liberian population is anticipated from possible restrictions on the Liberian ship register. Most of the staff of the Bureau are educated employees with specific technical qualifications and expertise. The majority of them would probably find other jobs or could emigrate to take up maritime-related work abroad.

46. Also, no direct effect on shipping to or from Liberia would be anticipated. However, for the international shipping industry, possible restrictions on the Liberian register would have quite important and far-reaching consequences given the large numbers of listed ships. Also, the above-mentioned government revenues would be affected by sanctions on the register. As the revenues from the Bureau represent the largest and most stable source of funding for the Liberian Government, the effects of a shortfall in this governmental income would be even more severe than those anticipated in case of restrictions on the timber or rubber industries.

VI. Observations

47. The Liberian economy is highly dependent on the export of traditional primary products and continues to be highly vulnerable to ongoing political and economic instability. Any restrictions imposed on this already weakened economy would probably have negative impacts on employment, social services and government revenues. A tightening of the existing sanctions regime is also expected to have further negative effects on the financial environment, with worsening exchange rates, increasing prices for essential commodities, decreased savings and more capital flight. These additional aggravating factors and their implications would particularly affect the most vulnerable of Liberia's population given that their resilience and coping capacities are next to exhausted.

48. Should the Council decide to establish additional sanctions, it may also wish to consider establishing a mechanism to regularly review their impact on the humanitarian and economic situation of Liberia. This would enable the Council to avoid unintended negative effects on Liberia's population and help to counter public misrepresentations of the sanctions regime and its objectives.

Notes

[1] HDI is a composite score of four variables: longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment and provision of services, as measured by adult literacy and the proportion of school-aged youth attending school; and standard of living, as estimated in real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity dollars.

[2] There are important potential impacts of logging and reforestation on the sustainability of the sector and the ecology of the Liberian environment, but the present assessment had neither the mandate nor the expertise to explore and elaborate on these long-term issues.

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Letter dated 4 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 3 October 2001 from the President of the Republic of Cuba, Mr. Fidel Castro Ruz, informing you of the decision by the Government of Cuba to accede to the 12 international legal instruments relating to the prevention and punishment of international terrorism (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 166, entitled "Measures to eliminate international terrorism", and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bruno Rodríguez **Parrilla**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 4 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Allow me to express Cuba's support for your statements in defence of the principles of international law and the role to be played by the United Nations in the critical world situation following the attacks against New York and Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001.

I wish to inform you that in response to your appeal to the members of the international community in your statements to the General Assembly on 26 September and 1 October, the Government of the Republic of Cuba has decided to accede, as you have requested, to the 12 existing international instruments related to terrorism, three of which Cuba has already approved and ratified.

In order to expedite the corresponding procedures, tomorrow, Thursday, 4 October, the Government will request the National Assembly of People's Power, which has been convened for a special session to pay homage to the victims of terrorism in our country, to endorse our accession to the nine instruments that are in the process of approval and ratification. Homage is being paid on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the terrorist act that blew up a Cubana aircraft in flight off Barbados, taking the lives of 73 passengers on board.

Likewise, our country will continue its efforts towards the conclusion of a general and comprehensive agreement against terrorism that would truly define such an obnoxious practice and allow the international community to tackle it in an efficient, urgent and steadfast way, with the full support of world public opinion and without unnecessary, useless and dangerous wars that provoke greater violence and hatred among peoples.

(*Signed*) Fidel **Castro Ruz**

United Nations A/ES-10/116–S/2001/941

General Assembly
Security Council

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5 October 2001

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 5 October 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Pre-dawn today (Palestine time), Israeli occupying forces invaded and reoccupied two neighbourhoods in Al-Khalil (Hebron), killing five Palestinians, injuring scores and destroying many homes and buildings. About 50 Israeli tanks and armoured personnel carriers rolled into the two neighbourhoods, Abu Sneineh and El-Sheikh, heavily shelling the neighbourhoods with tank fire, in addition to helicopter gunships. The occupying forces ousted Palestinian residents from at least 15 homes while demolishing many others. An Israeli spokesman said that the forces would remain on the site "as long as necessary".

This new Israeli war crime comes immediately after the Israeli Government decided that the army could take all necessary measures, which practically meant that the Israeli Government had decided to put aside the agreement on ceasefire. This crime also comes after a blister of hostile, dangerous and erratic statements made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Ariel Sharon. The statements made by the Israeli Government and the actions taken by the Israeli occupying forces have taken the situation and the whole area to a new dangerous and explosive level.

The international community, specifically the Security Council, must step in immediately to ensure reversal of the illegal steps taken by Israel, the occupying Power, to prevent further deterioration and to push for the immediate and comprehensive implementation of Mitchell's recommendations towards a final settlement.

I am writing this letter in follow-up to our previous 71 letters addressed to you regarding this grave and ongoing situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, dated from 29 September 2000 to 3 October 2001 (A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-

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S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605; A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629; A/ES-10/93-S/2001/657; A/ES-10/94-S/2001/669; A/ES-10/95-S/2001/686; A/ES-10/96-S/2001/697; A/ES-10/97-S/2001/708; A/ES-10/98-S/2001/717; A/ES-10/99-S/2001/742; A/ES-10/100-S/2001/754; A/ES-10/101-S/2001/783; A/ES-10/102-S/2001/785; A/ES-10/103-S/2001/798; A/ES-10/104-S/2001/812; A/ES-10/105-S/2001/814; A/ES-10/107-S/2001/821; A/ES-10/108-S/2001/826; A/ES-10/111-S/2001/880; A/ES-10/112-S/2001/918; A/ES-10/114-S/2001/928; and A/ES-10/115-S/2001/932). I regret to inform you that since our last letter to you, dated 3 October 2001, Israeli occupying forces have killed 7 more Palestinians, including the martyrs mentioned above, bringing the total number of Palestinian martyrs to 674. (The names of the martyrs are contained in the annex to the present letter.)

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 5 October 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem* (Wednesday, 3 October, through Friday, 5 October 2001)

Wednesday, 3 October 2001

Mohammed Awad

Thursday, 4 October 2001

Mohammed Imad Al-Sharabasi

Friday, 5 October 2001

1. Hazem Abdel Majeed Amr
2. Kasem Tawfiq Abu Afifah
3. Ra'ed Yussef Abu Seninah
4. Iyad Samir Kufeeshah
5. Nidal Mohammed Kufeeshah

* Total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 674.

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 5 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to an attack against Israel along our northern border that jeopardizes international peace and security.

On the evening of 3 October 2001, in a completely unprovoked attack, Hizbullah terrorists launched a cross-border mortar and missile attack from Lebanese territory directed against two positions in the Mount Dov region. Gunmen fired approximately 40 mortar rounds and anti-take missiles at locations on the Israeli side of the Blue Line.

This attack represents the latest violation of the Blue Line as established by the United Nations and, as such, constitutes a grave threat to peace and security along the border and in the region as a whole. Earlier violations have been detailed in my letters dated 6 July 2001 (A/56/161-S/2001/673), 16 April 2001 (S/2001/367), 16 February 2001 (A/55/792-S/2001/142), 6 February 2001 (A/55/767-S/2001/111), 26 November 2000 (S/2000/1121), 23 October 2000 (S/2000/1011), 19 October 2000 (S/2000/1002) and 7 October 2000 (S/2000/969).

Despite Israel's full and confirmed compliance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978), Hizbullah, with the assistance of both the Lebanese and Syrian Governments, has continually launched attacks against Israel across the Blue Line. These attacks violate basic norms of international law, most recently reaffirmed by Council resolution 1373 (2001), which obligates all States to prevent their territory from serving as a base for terrorist operations. These attacks further violate the provisions of Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1310 (2000) and 1337 (2001) — which call for the restoration of international peace and security, the return of the effective authority and presence of the Government of Lebanon in the south, and respect for the integrity of the Blue Line as determined by the Secretary-General and endorsed by the Council.

As the Secretary-General observed in his report on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon of 22 January 2001 (S/2001/66): "The greatest cause of concern, however, were the attacks across the Blue Line in the Shab'a farms area, which were deliberate acts in breach of the decisions of the Security Council" (para. 18). "The

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simplest and most direct way to ensure calm in the area is for the parties to act in accordance with the decision of the Security Council ... This implies that the Government of Lebanon asserts its effective authority and maintains law and order throughout its territory up to the line identified by the United Nations. That is its right and duty, consistently upheld by the Security Council and paid for with the lives of United Nations soldiers" (para. 19).

The continuation of unprovoked cross-border attacks on Israeli territory is due not only to Lebanon's failure to fulfil its international obligations, but to the ongoing support of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic for Hizbullah's terrorist operations. The Syrian Government continues to permit overland arms transfers to pass through Syrian territory from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Hizbullah's operatives. It allows Hizbullah to maintain terrorist training facilities in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley and grants its terrorists safe harbour in its territory. Moreover, by providing financial, political and organizational assistance, the Syrian Arab Republic has directly enhanced the capability of the Organization to launch attacks against Israel, in blatant violation of established legal norms, including the recently adopted Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), which requires that States refrain from providing any kind of support, whether active or tacit, to persons or entities involved in terror attacks.

In light of the above, and given the renewed global commitment to eradicating the scourge of terrorism, the international community must carefully scrutinize the Syrian Arab Republic's impending candidature for membership in the Security Council. As an occupier of a neighbouring country, recognized as a State that sponsors terrorism, and as a State that grants some of the world's most vicious terrorist organizations safe harbour in its territory, the Syrian Arab Republic's policies stand in blatant contradiction to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Member States must take care to ensure that only nations that strictly adhere, both in word and in deed, to the provisions of the Charter accede to membership in such an important organ of the world organization.

Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations explicitly states that in electing the non-permanent members of the Security Council "due regard must be specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security". As a State that has adopted the methods of violence rather than negotiation, and continues to do so, the Syrian Arab Republic has consistently acted to undermine international peace and security and should not be permitted to join the Council.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda **Lancry**
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/56/444-S/2001/943

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 5 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the latest incident of Palestinian terrorism directed against Israeli civilians.

Yesterday afternoon, a Palestinian terrorist, disguised as an Israeli soldier, disembarked from a public bus in the northern Israeli city of Afula and opened fire on a crowd of civilians. Haim Ben-Ezra, age 78, Tali Ben-Armon, age 20, and Sergei Frieden, age 20, were killed in the attack, and 13 others were wounded, 1 of them critically.

This attack is the latest incident in the ongoing Palestinian terrorist campaign against Israel that has been detailed in my letters dated 24 September 2001 (A/56/406-S/2001/907), 20 September 2001 (A/56/386-S/2001/892), 17 September 2001 (A/56/367-S/2001/875), 7 September 2001 (A/56/346-S/2001/858), 4 September 2001 (A/56/331-S/2001/840), 30 August 2001 (A/56/325-S/2001/834), 27 August 2001 (A/56/324-S/2001/825), 13 August 2001 (A/56/294-S/2001/787), 9 August 2001 (A/56/286-S/2001/780), 8 August 2001 (A/56/280-S/2001/775), 6 August 2001 (A/56/272-S/2001/768), 27 July 2001 (A/56/225-S/2001/743), 26 July 2001 (A/56/223-S/2001/737), 17 July 2001 (A/56/201-S/2001/706), 13 July 2001 (A/56/184-S/2001/696), 3 July 2001 (A/56/138-S/2001/662), 2 July 2001 (A/56/131-S/2001/656), 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000

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(A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108) and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

The State of Israel holds Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian leadership responsible for this attack in light of its relentless incitement of the population to violence, its open collusion with declared terrorist groups, and its adamant refusal to take concrete measures against known terrorists. Since the outbreak of violence over a year ago, the Palestinian Authority has released convicted terrorists from prison, openly aided and abetted them in carrying out their murderous aggression, and granted them safe harbour in the territory under its control.

Although Chairman Arafat called for a ceasefire last week following a meeting with Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres, not a single day has passed without an attack on Israeli civilians. Despite its claims, the Palestinian leadership has failed to take concrete actions to halt such attacks, to prevent terrorists from operating freely in the territory under its control, and to put an end to anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish incitement in the official Palestinian media.

Israel again calls on the Palestinian leadership to adhere to its commitment to renounce the use of violence and terrorism and to control and punish those who continue to engage in such practices. Israel further calls on the international community to remind the Palestinian Authority of the commitment, enshrined in Chairman Arafat's letter dated 9 September 1993, to renounce the use of violence and terror and to settle all outstanding issues through negotiations. This commitment cannot be fulfilled by mere lip service, but requires the fulfilment of obligations to prevent Palestinian territory from being used as a base for terror operations and return to the path of peaceful negotiations.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda **Lancry**
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/56/446–S/2001/944

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 5 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to forward herewith the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia issued on 4 October 2001 (see annex).

I should be most grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jargalsaikhany **Enkhsaikhan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-56716 (E) 051001

Annex to the letter dated 5 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia

The Government of Mongolia has always stood firm against international terrorism and has resolutely condemned the brutal attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., since the day this crime was committed, considering these acts as crimes against freedom and democracy. Bearing in mind the grave nature of these acts, the Government of Mongolia issued a statement in which it proposed to convene an emergency special session of the General Assembly to address ways and means of combating international terrorism. The Government of Mongolia welcomes and supports the consolidation of efforts of the international community in the fight against international terrorism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia has been entitled to announce the decision made by the State and Government of Mongolia to undertake the following measures.

1. The Government of Mongolia consistently supports the efforts to form an international coalition against terrorism. It stands ready to contribute to the coalition's activities through diplomatic, legal, financial, military and intelligence channels.

2. Mongolia will take, on its part, necessary measures to implement the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), calling for consolidating the efforts of the world community in the fight against terrorism.

3. Mongolia will actively work and coordinate its activities with the countries of the international coalition within the framework of the United Nations and other international organizations in implementing the resolutions and decisions to be taken by the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly aimed at intensifying the fight against terrorism.

4. Mongolia will cooperate with the countries requesting assistance in the combat against terrorism and undertake such legislative action as may be deemed necessary.

Ulaanbaatar 4 October 2001

United Nations S/2001/945

Security Council

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5 October 2001

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Letter dated 5 October 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached letter, dated 5 October 2001, from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-56776 (E) 051001

Annex

Letter dated 5 October 2001 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General

I would be grateful if you could arrange to transmit the attached letter to the President of the Security Council (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Mohamed **ElBaradei**

Enclosure

Letter dated 5 October 2001 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is requested to submit consolidated progress reports every six months to the Council, commencing 11 April 1996,[a] on the Agency verification activities in Iraq pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 of Council resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions.

For nearly three years, the Agency has not been in a position to implement its mandate in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and related resolutions. As a consequence, it is not able at present to provide any assurance that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under these resolutions. Clearly, the longer the suspension of resolution related inspections lasts, the more difficult it will be and the more time will be required for the Agency to re-establish a level of knowledge comparable with that achieved at the end of 1998.

As requested by paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), after consultation with technical experts from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and from Member States, the Agency has revised the nuclear-related list of items and technology to which the export/import mechanism approved by Council resolution 1051 (1996) applies. That list has been operative since 1 September 2001.[b] I should note that this document also constitutes annex 3 to the Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) plan approved by Council resolution 715 (1991), and lists those nuclear and nuclear-related items that are prohibited to Iraq or are subject to certain controls, including reporting by Iraq of their location and use. Such reporting is one of the components of the semi-annual declarations that Iraq is required to provide, according to paragraph 22 and annex 2 of the Agency's OMV plan, the last of which Iraq provided in July 1998.

During the period covered by the present report, the Agency has continued to expand and refine the structure and content of its information system, in the areas of computer support and analytical tools. Advances in commercially available satellite imagery have led to its integration in the Agency's Iraq-related information system. The Agency is planning to increase its data-collection and analytical effort in this area, in cooperation with UNMOVIC. Progress is also being made in the design of certain components of the wide-area environmental monitoring tools to be implemented in the field.

Enhanced analysis of the available original Iraqi documentation and the accumulated results of the past inspection process, as well as other available information, has also continued. This analysis is aimed at supporting and strengthening the preparation of the work plan requested by paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999). It has permitted the Agency to refine its technically coherent picture of Iraq's past clandestine nuclear programme and nuclear-related capabilities as of December 1998, but has not changed that picture. As stated in earlier reports, there remain a few questions and concerns regarding Iraq's past nuclear programme, the clarification of which would reduce the uncertainty in the completeness of the Agency's knowledge and understanding of that programme.

Provided that the Agency could satisfy itself that Iraq's past and present nuclear activities have not changed since December 1998, the uncertainties resulting from these questions and concerns would not prevent the Agency from moving to the full implementation of its OMV plan.

IAEA has maintained its readiness to resume verification and monitoring activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolutions. The Agency has kept the core staff of its Iraq Action Team and is prepared to resume these activities at short notice, with the assistance and cooperation of UNMOVIC.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter to be distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamed **ElBaradei**

Notes

[a] The previous consolidated reports of the Director General of IAEA were circulated as document S/1996/261 of 11 April 1996, as document S/1996/833 of 7 October 1996, as document S/1997/297 of 11 April 1997, as document S/1997/779 of 8 October 1997, as document S/1998/312 of 9 April 1998, as document S/1998/927 of 7 October 1998, as document S/1999/393 of 7 April 1999, as document S/1999/1035 of 7 October 1999, as document S/2000/300 of 11 April 2000, as document S/2000/983 of 11 October 2000 and as document S/2001/337 of 6 April 2001. Document S/1998/694, dated 27 July 1998, contained the text of an interim status report provided in response to the Security Council presidential statement (S/PRST/1998/11) dated 14 May 1998. Document S/1999/127, dated 9 February 1999, contained the text of an interim status report provided in response to the note by the President of the Security Council (S/1999/100) dated 30 January 1999.

[b] Letters relevant to the annex 3 revision and effective date are S/2001/561 of 5 June 2001 and S/2001/818 of 24 August 2001.

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Security Council

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7 October 2001

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Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that the United States of America, together with other States, has initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence following the armed attacks that were carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001.

On 11 September 2001, the United States was the victim of massive and brutal attacks in the states of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia. These attacks were specifically designed to maximize the loss of life; they resulted in the death of more than 5,000 persons, including nationals of 81 countries, as well as the destruction of four civilian aircraft, the World Trade Center towers and a section of the Pentagon. Since 11 September, my Government has obtained clear and compelling information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks. There is still much we do not know. Our inquiry is in its early stages. We may find that our self-defence requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other States.

The attacks on 11 September 2001 and the ongoing threat to the United States and its nationals posed by the Al-Qaeda organization have been made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this organization as a base of operation. Despite every effort by the United States and the international community, the Taliban regime has refused to change its policy. From the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda organization continues to train and support agents of terror who attack innocent people throughout the world and target United States nationals and interests in the United States and abroad.

In response to these attacks, and in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, United States armed forces have initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States. These actions include measures against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In carrying out these actions, the United States is committed to minimizing civilian casualties and damage to civilian property. In addition, the United States will continue its humanitarian efforts to alleviate the suffering of the people of Afghanistan. We are providing them with food, medicine and supplies.

01-56785 (E) 071001

I ask that you circulate the text of the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) John D. **Negroponte**

United Nations S/2001/947

Security Council

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7 October 2001

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Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish on behalf of my Government to report that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has military assets engaged in operations against targets that we know to be involved in the operation of terror against the United States of America, the United Kingdom and other countries around the world, as part of a wider international effort.

These forces have now been employed in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, recognized in Article 51, following the terrorist outrage of 11 September, to avert the continuing threat of attacks from the same source. My Government presented information to the United Kingdom Parliament on 4 October which showed that Usama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorist organization have the capability to execute major terrorist attacks, claimed credit for past attacks on United States targets, and have been engaged in a concerted campaign against the United States and its allies. One of their stated aims is the murder of United States citizens and attacks on the allies of the United States.

This military action has been carefully planned, and is directed against Usama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban regime that is supporting it. Targets have been selected with extreme care to minimize the risk to civilians.

It is important to underline that these operations are not directed against the Afghan population, or against Islam. The United Kingdom is proud to be a multicultural, multiracial country, and Prime Minister Blair has made clear the anger of the United Kingdom, and the anger of the vast majority of Muslims, to hear Usama Bin Laden and his associates described as "Islamic" terrorists. They are not: they are just ordinary terrorists.

I ask that you circulate the text of the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Stewart **Eldon**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

01-56791 (E) 071001

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Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 8 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the latest incident in the ongoing Palestinian campaign of terrorism directed against Israel.

Yesterday morning, at approximately 8.15 a.m. (local time), Yair Mordechai, age 44, was returning to Kibbutz Shluhot when he spotted a suspicious-looking Palestinian by the side of the road. When Mordechai pulled over to question him, the terrorist detonated an explosive he was wearing on his belt. The blast killed Mordechai and completely destroyed his vehicle.

The murder of Yair Mordechai is the latest attack in an ongoing Palestinian terrorist campaign that has been detailed in my letters dated 5 October 2001 (A/56/444-S/2001/943), 3 October 2001 (A/56/438-S/2001/938), 24 September 2001 (A/56/406-S/2001/907), 20 September 2001 (A/56/386-S/2001/892), 17 September 2001 (A/56/367-S/2001/875), 7 September 2001 (A/56/346-S/2001/858), 4 September 2001 (A/56/331-S/2001/840), 30 August 2001 (A/56/325-S/2001/834), 27 August 2001 (A/56/324-S/2001/825), 13 August 2001 (A/56/294-S/2001/787), 9 August 2001 (A/56/286-S/2001/780), 8 August 2001 (A/56/280-S/2001/775), 6 August 2001 (A/56/272-S/2001/768), 27 July 2001 (A/56/225-S/2001/743), 26 July 2001 (A/56/223-S/2001/737), 17 July 2001 (A/56/201-S/2001/706), 13 July 2001 (A/56/184-S/2001/696), 3 July 2001 (A/56/138-S/2001/662), 2 July 2001 (A/56/131-S/2001/656), 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001

01-56917 (E) 081001

(A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108) and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

The State of Israel holds chairman Arafat and the Palestinian leadership responsible for this attack in the light of their unending incitement to violence and terrorism, their support and assistance for known terrorist groups, and their refusal to take sustained and concrete measures to end terrorism against Israelis. The Palestinian leadership has also encouraged terrorism by releasing convicted terrorists from prison, assisting them in carrying out their deadly missions, and providing them with safe harbour in Palestinian-controlled territory.

Despite Chairman Arafat's recent call for a ceasefire, attacks against Israeli civilians have escalated in recent days. The Palestinian leadership's preference for words over actions, its failure to take measures to impede the freedom of terrorists operating in the territory under its control, and its continuing use of the official Palestinian media to incite the population are directly responsible for the failure of the ceasefire.

Israel again calls on the Palestinian leadership to adhere to its commitment to renounce the use of violence and terrorism and to control and punish those who continue to engage in such practices. Israel further calls on the international community to compel the Palestinian Authority to associate itself, in both word and deed, with those actively opposing terrorism by preventing Palestinian territory from being used as a base for terror operations.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda **Lancry**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/949

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 8 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to request that the enclosed document, prepared by the office of my Prime Minister, about responsibility for the terrorist atrocities in the United States of America on 11 September 2001, be circulated as a document of the Security Council (see annex).

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**

01-56972 (E) 091001

Annex to the letter dated 8 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

This document does not purport to provide a prosecutable case against Usama Bin Laden in a court of law. Intelligence often cannot be used evidentially, due both to the strict rules of admissibility and to the need to protect the safety of sources. But on the basis of all the information available the UK Government is confident of its conclusions as expressed in this document.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TERRORIST ATROCITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

INTRODUCTION

1. The clear conclusions reached by the government are:

- Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida, the terrorist network which he heads, planned and carried out the atrocities on 11 September 2001;
- Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida retain the will and resources to carry out further atrocities;
- the United Kingdom, and United Kingdom nationals are potential targets; and
- Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida were able to commit these atrocities because of their close alliance with the Taleban régime, which allowed them to operate with impunity in pursuing their terrorist activity.

2. The material in respect of 1998 and the USS *Cole* comes from indictments and intelligence sources. The material in respect of 11 September comes from intelligence and the criminal investigation to date. The details of some aspects cannot be given, but the facts are clear from the intelligence.

3. The document does not contain the totality of the material known to the UK Government, given the continuing and absolute need to protect intelligence sources.

SUMMARY

4. The relevant facts show:

Background

- Al Qaida is a terrorist organisation with ties to a global network, which has been in existence for over 10 years. It was founded, and has been led at all times, by

Usama Bin Laden.

- Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida have been engaged in a jihad against the United States, and its allies. One of their stated aims is the murder of US citizens, and attacks on America's allies.

- Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida have been based in Afghanistan since 1996, but have a network of operations throughout the world. The network includes training camps, warehouses, communication facilities and commercial operations able to raise significant sums of money to support its activity. That activity includes substantial exploitation of the illegal drugs trade from Afghanistan.

- Usama Bin Laden's Al Qaida and the Taleban régime have a close and mutually dependent alliance. Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida provide the Taleban régime with material, financial and military support. They jointly exploit the drugs trade. The Taleban régime allows Bin Laden to operate his terrorist training camps and activities from Afghanistan, protects him from attacks from outside, and protects the drugs stockpiles. Usama Bin Laden could not operate his terrorist activities without the alliance and support of the Taleban régime. The Taleban's strength would be seriously weakened without Usama Bin Laden's military and financial support.

- Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida have the capability to execute major terrorist attacks.

- Usama Bin Laden has claimed credit for the attack on US soldiers in Somalia in October 1993, which killed 18; for the attack on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 which killed 224 and injured nearly 5000; and were linked to the attack on the USS *Cole* on 12 October 2000, in which 17 crew members were killed and 40 others injured.

- They have sought to acquire nuclear and chemical materials for use as terrorist weapons.

In relation to the terrorist attacks on 11 September

5. After 11 September we learned that, not long before, Bin Laden had indicated he was about to launch a major attack on America. The detailed planning for the terrorist attacks of 11 September was carried out by one of UBL's close associates. Of the 19 hijackers involved in 11 September 2001, it has already been established that at least three had links with Al Qaida. The attacks on 11 September 2001 were similar in both their ambition and intended impact to previous attacks undertaken by Usama Bin laden and Al Qaida, and also had features in common. In particular:

- Suicide attackers
  - Co-ordinated attacks on the same day
  - The aim to cause maximum American casualties
  - Total disregard for other casualties, including Muslim
- Meticulous long-term planning

- Absence of warning.

6. Al Qaida retains the capability and the will to make further attacks on the US and its allies, including the United Kingdom.

7. Al Qaida gives no warning of terrorist attack.

THE FACTS

Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida

8. In 1989 Usama Bin Laden, and others, founded an international terrorist group known as "Al Qaida" (the Base). At all times he has been the leader of Al Qaida.

9. From 1989 until 1991 Usama Bin Laden was based in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan. In 1991 he moved to Sudan, where he stayed until 1996. In that year he returned to Afghanistan, where he remains.

The Taleban Regime

10. The Taleban emerged from the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan in the early 1990s. By 1996 they had captured Kabul. They are still engaged in a bloody civil war to control the whole of Afghanistan. They are led by Mullah Omar.

11. In 1996 Usama Bin Laden moved back to Afghanistan. He established a close relationship with Mullah Omar, and threw his support behind the Taleban. Usama Bin Laden and the Taleban régime have a close alliance on which both depend for their continued existence. They also share the same religious values and vision.

12. Usama Bin Laden has provided the Taleban régime with troops, arms, and money to fight the Northern Alliance. He is closely involved with Taleban military training, planning and operations. He has representatives in the Taleban military command structure. He has also given infrastruture assistance and humanitarian aid. Forces under the control of Usama Bin Laden have fought alongside the Taleban in the civil war in Afghanistan.

13. Omar has provided Bin Laden with a safe haven in which to operate, and has allowed him to establish terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. They jointly exploit the Afghan drugs trade. In return for active Al Qaida support, the Taleban allow Al Qaida to operate freely, including planning, training and preparing for terrorist activity. In addition the Taleban provide security for the stockpiles of drugs.

14. Since 1996, when the Taleban captured Kabul, the United States government has consistently raised with them a whole range of issues, including humanitarian aid and terrorism. Well before 11 September 2001 they had provided evidence to the Taleban of the responsibility of Al Qaida for the terrorist attacks in East Africa. This evidence had been provided to senior leaders of the Taleban at their request.

15. The United States government had made it clear to the Taleban regime that Al Qaida had murdered US citizens, and planned to murder more. The US offered to work with the Taleban to expel the terrorists from Afghanistan. These talks, which have been continuing since 1996, have failed to produce any results.

16. In June 2001, in the face of mounting evidence of the Al Qaida threat, the United

States warned the Taleban that it had the right to defend itself and that it would hold the régime responsible for attacks against US citizens by terrorists sheltered in Afghanistan

17. In this, the United States had the support of the United Nations. The Security Council, in Resolution 1267, condemned Usama Bin Laden for sponsoring international terrorism and operating a network of terrorist camps, and demanded that the Taleban surrender Usama Bin Laden without further delay so that he could be brought to justice.

18. Despite the evidence provided by the US of the responsibility of Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida for the 1998 East Africa bombings, despite the accurately perceived threats of further atrocities, and despite the demands of the United Nations, the Taleban régime responded by saying no evidence existed against Usama Bin Laden, and that neither he nor his network would be expelled.

19. A former Government official in Afghanistan has described the Taleban and Usama Bin Laden as "two sides of the same coin: Usama cannot exist in Afghanistan without the Taleban and the Taleban cannot exist without Usama."

Al Qaida

20. Al Qaida is dedicated to opposing 'un-Islamic' governments in Muslim countries with force and violence.

21. Al Qaida virulently opposes the United States. Usama Bin Laden has urged and incited his followers to kill American citizens, in the most unequivocal terms.

22. On 12 October 1996 he issued a declaration of jihad as follows:

> *"The people of Islam have suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed by the Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators . . .*
>
> *It is the duty now on every tribe in the Arabian peninsula to fight jihad and cleanse the land from these Crusader occupiers. Their wealth is booty to those who kill them.*
>
> *My Muslim brothers: your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places* [i.e. Saudi Arabia] *are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy – the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you can to expel the enemies out of the sanctities of Islam."*

Later in the same year he said that

> *"terrorising the American occupiers [*of Islamic Holy Places*] is a religious and logical obligation."*

In February 1998 he issued and signed a 'fatwa' which included a decree to all Muslims:

> *". . . the killing of Americans and their civilian and military allies is a religious duty for each and every Muslim to be carried out in whichever country they are until Al Aqsa mosque has been liberated from their grasp and until their armies have left Muslim lands."*

In the same 'fatwa' he called on Muslim scholars and their leaders and their youths to

"launch an attack on the American soldiers of Satan."

and concluded:

> *"We – with God's help – call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill Americans and plunder their money whenever and wherever they find it. We also call on Muslims . . . to launch the raid on Satan's US troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them."*

When asked, in 1998, about obtaining chemical or nuclear weapons he said

> *"acquiring such weapons for the defence of Muslims [was] a religious duty."*

In an interview aired on Al Jazira (Doha, Qatar) television he stated:

> *"Our enemy is every American male, whether he is directly fighting us or paying taxes."*

In two interviews broadcast on US television in 1997 and 1998 he referred to the terrorists who carried out the earlier attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 as "*role models*". He went on to exhort his followers "*to take the fighting to America.*"

23. From the early 1990s Usama Bin Laden has sought to obtain nuclear and chemical materials for use as weapons of terror.

24. Although US targets are Al Qaida's priority, it also explicitly threatens the United States' allies. References to "*Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators*," and to "*Satan's US troops and the devil's supporters allying with them*" are references which unquestionably include the United Kingdom.

25. There is a continuing threat. Based on our experience of the way the network has operated in the past, other cells, like those that carried out the terrorist attacks on 11 September, must be assumed to exist.

26. Al Qaida functions both on its own and through a network of other terrorist organisations. These include Egyptian Islamic Jihad and other north African Islamic extremist terrorist groups, and a number of other jihadi groups in other countries including the Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan and India. Al Qaida also maintains cells and personnel in a number of other countries to facilitate its activities.

27. Usama Bin Laden heads the Al Qaida network. Below him is a body known as the Shura, which includes representatives of other terrorist groups, such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman Zawahiri and prominent lieutenants of Bin Laden such as Abu Hafs Al-Masri. Egyptian Islamic Jihad has, in effect, merged with Al Qaida.

28. In addition to the Shura, Al Qaida has several groups dealing with military, media, financial and Islamic issues.

29. Mohamed Atef is a member of the group that deals with military and terrorist operations. His duties include principal responsibility for training Al Qaida members.

30. Members of Al Qaida must make a pledge of allegiance to follow the orders of Usama Bin Laden.

31. A great deal of evidence about Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida has been made available in the US indictment for earlier crimes.

32. Since 1989, Usama Bin Laden has conducted substantial financial and business transactions on behalf of Al Qaida and in pursuit of its goals. These include purchasing land for training camps, purchasing warehouses for the storage of items, including explosives, purchasing communications and electronics equipment, and transporting currency and weapons to members of Al Qaida and associated terrorist groups in countries throughout the world.

33. Since 1989 Usama Bin Laden has provided training camps and guest houses in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Sudan, Somalia and Kenya for the use of Al Qaida and associated terrorist groups. We know from intelligence that there are currently at least a dozen camps across Afghanistan, of which at least four are used for training terrorists.

34. Since 1989, Usama Bin Laden has established a series of businesses to provide income for Al Qaida, and to provide cover for the procurement of explosives, weapons and chemicals, and for the travel of Al Qaida operatives. The businesses have included a holding company known as 'Wadi Al Aqiq', a construction business known as 'Al Hijra', an agricultural business known as 'Al Themar Al Mubaraka', and investment companies known as 'Ladin International' and 'Taba Investments'.

Usama Bin Laden and previous attacks

35. In 1992 and 1993 Mohamed Atef travelled to Somalia on several occasions for the purpose of organising violence against United States and United Nations troops then stationed in Somalia. On each occasion he reported back to Usama Bin Laden, at his base in the Riyadh district of Khartoum.

36. In the spring of 1993 Atef, Saif al Adel, another senior member of Al Qaida, and other members began to provide military training to Somali tribes for the purpose of fighting the United Nations forces.

37. On 3 and 4 October 1993 operatives of Al Qaida participated in the attack on US military personnel serving in Somalia as part of the operation 'Restore Hope.' Eighteen US military personnel were killed in the attack.

38. From 1993 members of Al Qaida began to live in Nairobi and set up businesses there, including Asma Ltd, and Tanzanite King. They were regularly visited there by senior members of Al Qaida, in particular by Atef and Abu Ubadiah al Banshiri.

39. Beginning in the latter part of 1993, members of Al Qaida in Kenya began to discuss the possibility of attacking the US Embassy in Nairobi in retaliation for US participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Ali Mohamed, a US citizen and admitted member of Al Qaida, surveyed the US Embassy as a possible target for a terrorist attack. He took photographs and made sketches, which he presented to Usama Bin Laden while Bin Laden was in Sudan. He also admitted that he had trained terrorists for Al Qaida in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, and that those whom he trained included many involved in the East African bombings in August 1998.

40. In June or July 1998, two Al Qaida operatives, Fahid Mohammed Ali Msalam and Sheik Ahmed Salim Swedan, purchased a Toyota truck and made various alterations to the back of the truck.

41. In early August 1998, operatives of Al Qaida gathered in 43, New Runda Estates, Nairobi to execute the bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi.

42. On 7 August 1998, Assam, a Saudi national and Al Qaida operative, drove the Toyota truck to the US embassy. There was a large bomb in the back of the truck.

43. Also in the truck was Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al 'Owali, another Saudi. He, by his own confession, was an Al Qaida operative, who from about 1996 had been trained in Al Qaida camps in Afghanistan in explosives, hijacking, kidnapping, assassination and intelligence techniques. With Usama Bin Laden's express permission, he fought alongside the Taleban in Afghanistan. He had met Usama Bin Laden personally in 1996 and asked for another 'mission.' Usama Bin Laden sent him to East Africa after extensive specialised training at camps in Afghanistan.

44. As the truck approached the Embassy, Al 'Owali got out and threw a stun grenade at a security guard. Assam drove the truck up to the rear of the embassy. He got out and then detonated the bomb, which demolished a multi-storey secretarial college and severely damaged the US embassy, and the Co-operative bank building. The bomb killed 213 people and injured 4500. Assam was killed in the explosion.

45. Al 'Owali expected the mission to end in his death. He had been willing to die for Al Qaida. But at the last minute he ran away from the bomb truck and survived. He had no money, passport or plan to escape after the mission, because he had expected to die.

46. After a few days, he called a telephone number in Yemen to have money transferred to him in Kenya. The number he rang in Yemen was contacted by Usama Bin Laden's phone on the same day as Al 'Owali was arranging to get the money.

47. Another person arrested in connection with the Nairobi bombing was Mohamed Sadeek Odeh. He admitted to his involvement. He identified the principal participants in the bombing. He named three other persons, all of whom were Al Qaida or Egyptian Islamic Jihad members.

48. In Dar es Salaam the same day, at about the same time, operatives of Al Qaida detonated a bomb at the US embassy, killing 11 people. The Al Qaida operatives involved included Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil and Khaflan Khamis Mohamed. The bomb was carried in a Nissan Atlas truck, which Ahmed Khfaklan Ghailani and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, two Al Qaida operatives, had purchased in July 1998, in Dar es Salaam.

49. Khaflan Khamis Mohamed was arrested for the bombing. He admitted membership of Al Qaida, and implicated other members of Al Qaida in the bombing.

50. On 7 and 8 August 1998, two other members of Al Qaida disseminated claims of responsibility for the two bombings by sending faxes to media organisations in Paris, Doha in Qatar, and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.

51. Additional evidence of the involvement of Al Qaida in the East African bombings came from a search conducted in London of several residences and businesses belonging to Al Qaida and Egyptian Islamic Jihad members. In those searches a number of documents were found including claims of responsibility for the East African bombings in the name of a fictitious group, 'the Islamic Army for the liberation of the Holy Places.'

52. Al 'Owali, the would-be suicide bomber, admitted he was told to make a videotape

of himself using the name of the same fictitious group.

53. The faxed claims of responsibility were traced to a telephone number, which had been in contact with Usama Bin Laden's cell phone. The claims disseminated to the press were clearly written by someone familiar with the conspiracy. They stated that the bombings had been carried out by two Saudis in Kenya, and one Egyptian in Dar es Salaam. They were probably sent before the bombings had even taken place. They referred to two Saudis dying in the Nairobi attack. In fact, because Al 'Owali fled at the last minute, only one Saudi died.

54. On 22 December 1998 Usama Bin Laden was asked by *Time* magazine whether he was responsible for the August 1998 attacks. He replied:

> *"The International Islamic Jihad Front for the jihad against the US and Israel has, by the grace of God, issued a crystal clear fatwa calling on the Islamic nation to carry on Jihad aimed at liberating the holy sites. The nation of Mohammed has responded to this appeal. If instigation for jihad against the Jews and the Americans . . . is considered to be a crime, then let history be a witness that I am a criminal. Our job is to instigate and, by the grace of God, we did that, and certain people responded to this instigation."*

He was asked if he knew the attackers:

> *". . . those who risked their lives to earn the pleasure of God are real men. They managed to rid the Islamic nation of disgrace. We hold them in the highest esteem."*

And what the US could expect of him:

> *". . . any thief or criminal who enters another country to steal should expect to be exposed to murder at any time . . . The US knows that I have attacked it, by the grace of God, for more than ten years now . . . God knows that we have been pleased by the killing of American soldiers [*in Somalia in 1993*]. This was achieved by the grace of God and the efforts of the mujahideen . . . Hostility towards America is a religious duty and we hope to be rewarded for it by God. I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the legend of the so-called superpower that is America."*

55. In December 1999 a terrorist cell linked to Al Qaida was discovered trying to carry out attacks inside the United States. An Algerian, Ahmed Ressam, was stopped at the US-Canadian border and over 100 lbs of bomb making material was found in his car. Ressam admitted he was planning to set off a large bomb at Los Angeles International airport on New Year's Day. He said that he had received terrorist training at Al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and then been instructed to go abroad and kill US civilians and military personnel.

56. On 3 January 2000, a group of Al Qaida members, and other terrorists who had trained in Al Qaida camps in Afghanistan, attempted to attack a US destroyer with a small boat loaded with explosives. Their boat sank, aborting the attack.

57. On 12 October 2000, however, the USS *Cole* was struck by an explosive-laden boat while refuelling in Aden harbour. Seventeen crew were killed, and 40 injured.

58. Several of the perpetrators of the *Cole* attack (mostly Yemenis and Saudis) were trained at Usama Bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan. Al 'Owali has identified the two commanders of the attack on the USS *Cole* as having participated in the planning and preparation for the East African embassy bombings.

59. In the months before the September 11 attacks, propaganda videos were distributed throughout the Middle East and Muslim world by Al Qaida, in which Usama Bin Laden and others were shown encouraging Muslims to attack American and Jewish targets.

60. Similar videos, extolling violence against the United States and other targets, were distributed before the East African embassy attacks in August 1998.

Usama Bin Laden and the 11 September attacks

61. Nineteen men have been identified as the hijackers from the passenger lists of the four planes hijacked on 11 September 2001. At least three of them have already been positively identified as associates of Al Qaida. One has been identified as playing key roles in both the East African embassy attacks and the USS *Cole* attack. Investigations continue into the backgrounds of all the hijackers.

62. From intelligence sources, the following facts have been established subsequent to 11 September; for intelligence reasons, the names of associates, though known, are not given.

- In the run-up to 11 September, bin Laden was mounting a concerted propaganda campaign amongst like-minded groups of people – including videos and documentation – justifying attacks on Jewish and American targets; and claiming that those who died in the course of them were carrying out God's work.
- We have learned, subsequent to 11 September, that Bin Laden himself asserted shortly before 11 September that he was preparing a major attack on America.
- In August and early September close associates of Bin Laden were warned to return to Afghanistan from other parts of the world by 10 September.
- Immediately prior to 11 September some known associates of Bin Laden were naming the date for action as on or around 11 September.
- Since 11 September we have learned that one of Bin Laden's closest and most senior associates was responsible for the detailed planning of the attacks.
- There is evidence of a very specific nature relating to the guilt of Bin Laden and his associates that is too sensitive to release.

63. Usama Bin Laden remains in charge, and the mastermind, of Al Qaida. In Al Qaida, an operation on the scale of the 11 September attacks would have been approved by Usama Bin Laden himself.

64. The modus operandi of 11 September was entirely consistent with previous attacks. Al Qaida's record of atrocities is characterised by meticulous long term planning, a desire to inflict mass casualties, suicide bombers, and multiple simultaneous attacks.

65. The attacks of 11 September 2001 are entirely consistent with the scale and sophistication of the planning which went into the attacks on the East African

Embassies and the USS *Cole*. No warnings were given for these three attacks, just as there was none on 11 September.

66. Al Qaida operatives, in evidence given in the East African Embassy bomb trials, have described how the group spends years preparing for an attack. They conduct repeated surveillance, patiently gather materials, and identify and vet operatives, who have the skills to participate in the attack and the willingness to die for their cause.

67. The operatives involved in the 11 September atrocities attended flight schools, used flight simulators to study the controls of larger aircraft and placed potential airports and routes under surveillance.

68. Al Qaida's attacks are characterised by total disregard for innocent lives, including Muslims. In an interview after the East African bombings, Usama Bin Laden insisted that the need to attack the United States excused the killing of other innocent civilians, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

69. No other organisation has both the motivation and the capability to carry out attacks like those of the 11 September – only the Al Qaida network under Usama Bin Laden.

Conclusion

70. The attacks of the 11 September 2001 were planned and carried out by Al Qaida, an organisation whose head is Usama Bin Laden. That organisation has the will, and the resources, to execute further attacks of similar scale. Both the United States and its close allies are targets for such attacks. The attack could not have occurred without the alliance between the Taleban and Usama Bin Laden, which allowed Bin Laden to operate freely in Afghanistan, promoting, planning and executing terrorist activity.

United Nations S/2001/950

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 3 October 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the presidential statement dated 3 May 2001 (S/PRST/2001/13), by which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a final period of three months, and requested that the Panel submit, through me, an addendum to its final report.

The Panel resumed its activities in late July under the chairmanship of Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem. Recently, Ambassador Kassem notified the Secretariat that, while the Panel would need additional time to complete its work, it would be able to submit its report to the Security Council by mid-November 2001.

Accordingly, I should like to recommend that the Panel's mandate be extended until 30 November 2001. Such an extension would also enable Ambassador Kassem to present his report to the Council and to finalize the Panel's work thereafter.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-57023 (E) 081001

United Nations S/2001/951

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 8 October 2001 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 3 October 2001 (S/2001/950) concerning the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of your recommendation that the Panel's mandate be extended until 30 November 2001 to enable the Panel to submit its report to the Council by mid-November 2001.

(*Signed*) Richard **Ryan**
President of the Security Council

01-57029 (E) 081001

United Nations S/2001/952

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 5 October 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

On 18 September 2001, I appointed the following five experts to serve on the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 (2001):

Michael Chandler (United Kingdom);

Philippe Graver (France);

Amod Gurung (Nepal);

Ashraf Mohsen Mohamed Mohsen (Egypt);

Daniel Yorks (United States of America).

I was subsequently informed that two of those experts, Ashraf Mohsen and Daniel Yorks were unable to assume their functions.

Accordingly, in consultation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), and taking into account the requirements stated in the above-mentioned resolution, I wish to inform you that I have appointed the following two experts to serve on the Monitoring Group in New York:

Michael D. Langan (United States of America);

Hassan H. Ali Abaza (Jordan).

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

01-57113 (E) 091001